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Strategic Experimentation: a Revision
Patrick Bolton
CentER for Economic Research, Tilburg University








This paper extends the classic two-armed bandit problem to a
many-agent setting in which I players each face the same experi-
mentation problem. The main change from the single-agent prob-
lem is that an agent can now learn from the current experimentation
of other agents. Information is therefore a public good, and a free-
rider problem in experimentation naturally arises. More interestingly,
the prospect of future experimentation by others encourages agents
to increase current experimentation, in order to bring forward the
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time at which the extra information generated by such experimenta-
tion becomes available. The paper provides an analysis of the set of
stationary Markov equilibria in terms of the free-rider eect and the
encouragement eect.
The paper is a revision of our earlier paper, Bolton and Harris
[7]. The main modication concerns the formulation of randomization
in continuous time. C.f. Harris [12]. The earlier paper explored
one formulation based on the idea of rapid alternation over the state
space. The current paper explores a formulation which is the closest
analogue of the discrete-time formulation. It is based on the idea of
randomization at each instant of time.
3
1 Introduction
This paper analyses a game of strategic experimentation in which individual
players can learn from the experiments of others as well as their own. Given
that experimentation typically entails an opportunity cost, and that infor-
mation obtained from an experiment is valuable to all players, individual
players attempt to free ride on the experiments of others. This informational
externality drives a wedge between equilibrium experimentation and socially
optimal experimentation. On the other hand, an individual player may be
encouraged to experiment more if, by so doing, she can bring forward the
time at which the information generated by the experimentation of others
becomes available. This encouragement eect mitigates the free-rider eect.
The objective of the paper is to analyze socially optimal and equilibrium
experimentation strategies in terms of the free-rider and the encouragement
eects.
The game of strategic experimentation we consider is a many-player
common-value extension of the classic continuous-time two-armed bandit
problem as presented in Karatzas [14] and Berry and Fristedt [4]. At any
given time, each player in our game must choose between the `safe' action
and the `risky' action. The underlying payo of the safe action is known and
common to all players. The underlying payo of the risky action is unknown
but common to all players, and it can be either higher or lower than that of
the safe action.
The actual payo obtained by a player from an action is the underlying
payo of that action plus noise. Once the actions have been chosen and
the payos realized, all players observe all actions chosen and all payos.
They therefore obtain information about the underlying payo of the risky
action by observing the payos obtained by those players who chose to ex-
periment. They also observe a background signal. This signal provides them
with further information about the underlying payo of the risky action. In
particular, it ensures that some information is obtained even when no player
chooses to experiment.
In the case of socially optimal experimentation, we restrict attention to
symmetric optima. The socially optimal experimentation policy is very sim-
ple. There is a cuto C 2 (0; 1) such that no player experiments when the
common belief p that the unknown payo is greater than the known payo
falls below C, and such that all the players experiment when p exceeds C.
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Simple and intuitive comparative statics results about the socially optimal
solution are also obtained, the most interesting being that the payo of a
representative player is increasing in both the number of players and the
quality of background information.
These results are easy to explain. The payo of a representative player is
increasing with the number of players because of the public good nature of
the information produced through experimentation: the larger the number
of players, the smaller the contribution of any one player to any given level
of provision of the public good. The result that the payo of a representa-
tive player is increasing in the quality of background information is a direct
consequence of the envelope theorem: the shadow value of information is
positive and therefore more background information increases the payo.
In the case of equilibrium experimentation, we restrict attention to sym-
metric equilibria in stationary Markov strategies. Associated with any sym-
metric equilibrium there are cutos C1 and CN . Players experiment with
probability 0 when p falls below C1, with probability rising continuously
from 0 to 1 as p rises from C1 to CN , and with probability 1 when p exceeds
CN . Because of free riding, the payo of a representative player in a sym-
metric equilibrium is strictly less than the full-information payo, even in
the limit as the number of players tends to innity. This is a stark illustra-
tion of the strength of the free-rider eect. However, despite free riding, the
symmetric-equilibrium payo is rising both in the number of players and in
the quality of background information.
The latter results are by no means obvious, since total information is
not monotonic either in the number of players or in the quality of back-
ground information. Indeed, when there is no discounting, total information
is independent of the number of players for low values of p, decreasing for
intermediate values of p, and increasing for high values of p. Similarly, again
when there is no discounting, total information is increasing in the quality
of background information for low values of p, decreasing for intermediate
values of p, and increasing for high values of p.
They can, however, be explained by decomposing the dierent eects of
an increase in the number of players or in background information on the
payo of a representative player into three parts: the direct eect of the
change on her objective, the indirect eect on her objective of the change in
the behavior of the other players, and the indirect eect on her objective of
the change in her own behavior. The second eect is a strategic eect. The
5
third is always zero by the envelope theorem.
Increasing the number of players has no direct eect on the objective of a
typical player. As for the strategic eect, total experimentation by the other
players is unchanged at 0 for low values of p, and increases from N   1 to
N for high values of p. For intermediate values of p, there is both a free-
rider and an encouragement eect. However, from the point of view of any
given player, the reduction in the per capita experimentation of the other
players that results from free riding on the new player is exactly oset by
the increase in the number of players. The encouragement eect therefore
dominates. Overall, then, experimentation by the other players rises.
Increasing background information has a direct positive eect on the ob-
jective of a typical player. It does, however, have a potentially ambiguous
eect on the experimentation by the other players. They will want to free
ride on the extra information available currently, but they will also want to
experiment more, to take better advantage of the extra information avail-
able in the future. From the point of view of the chosen player, however,
the reduction in the experimentation of the other players that results from
free riding is exactly oset by the increase in background information. It is
therefore the encouragement eect that wins out overall.
Two aspects of our modelling strategy deserve comment: our use of a
continuous-time formulation of the two-armed bandit problem, and our in-
troduction of background information.
We work with a continuous-time formulation of the two-armed bandit
problem for reasons of tractability. This formulation allows us to obtain
closed-form solutions for the socially ecient experimentation strategy and
for the associated value function. Similarly, in the special case with no dis-
counting, it allows us to obtain closed-form solutions for equilibrium ex-
perimentation strategies and the associated value functions. Such a sharp
characterization could not be obtained in a discrete-time formulation.
We work with background information for two main reasons. First, in the
presence of background information, the undiscounted case is non-degenerate.
This allows us to begin our analysis of strategic experimentation with consid-
eration of an easier special case. Secondly, much of the literature on optimal
experimentation has focused on the question of whether complete learning
takes place in the long run. See Rothschild [20], McLennan [17], Easley and
Kiefer [9] and Aghion, Bolton, Harris and Jullien [1], for example. In the
presence of background information, this question does not arise: no matter
6
what experimentation strategy players follow, they end up acquiring com-
plete information. This leads us to focus on a dierent question, namely
how fast players can and ought to learn. Answering this question amounts
to determining equilibrium and socially optimal experimentation strategies.
Interestingly enough, it turns out that the socially optimal experimentation
strategy is qualitatively very similar to that for the case of no background
information.
The literature on social learning or learning by experimentation in many-
player settings is growing rapidly. To our knowledge only one other paper
(Smith [22]) considers a similar framework to ours. Smith focuses on limit
beliefs and does not attempt to characterize socially optimal or equilibrium
experimentation strategies. Several other papers on social learning in settings
with a pure informational externality deal with issues related to ours. Hen-
dricks and Kovenock [13] consider a nitely repeated game of oil exploration
between two oil companies owning adjacent oil elds. Ellison and Fudenberg
[10] analyze an innitely repeated game of social learning in which individ-
ual players can learn from their own experience and that of their neighbors.
Players follow intuitively plausible rules of thumb to determine their exper-
imentation actions. Chamley and Gale [8] emphasize the free riding aspect
of social learning in a game of timing of investments.
A second set of papers on social learning combines the informational ex-
ternality of experimentation with other strategic interactions among players.
Thus, Bhattacharya, Chatterjee and Samuelson [5] consider a game of strate-
gic research and development. Mirman, Samuelson and Urbano [18] consider
a game of duopoly signal jamming in which the experiments of one player
partly serve the purpose of confusing the other player. Rob [19] studies a
game of entry with unknown market size. In this game, each entrant imposes
two externalities on the other players, a positive informational externality on
future potential entrants who learn something about the size of the mar-
ket following entry, and a negative externality on incumbents who see their
prots reduced as a result of entry. Finally, Aghion, Espinosa and Jullien
[2] consider a Bertrand pricing game in which equilibrium price dispersion is
the result of learning by experimentation. As these models combine dierent
strategic interactions besides the informational externality it is dicult to
compare them with one another.
A nal set of papers to which our work is related is the recent literature
on herd behavior. These papers consider social learning when the payos
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associated with actions are not perfectly observable by all players. Banerjee
[3] and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch [6] consider a one-shot game
in which players move sequentially and observe the moves of the players
ahead of them but not their payos. Both papers show that inecient herd
behavior may occur in this setting. These papers raise the question of the
relation between free-riding and herding. Also, an open question is to what
extent herding phenomena survive in a repeated setting. This question has
recently been addressed by Vives in a setting without experimentation [23].
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 solves the ltering problem for any prole of experimentation actions. Sec-
tion 4 sets up the optimization problem faced by the players when they act
as a team. The team problem can be described by a Bellman equation. Sec-
tion 5 uses an alternative form for the Bellman equation to characterize the
team solution. Section 6 gives the comparative statics of the team solution.
Section 7 illustrates and discusses the two main informational externalities
between players in this model: the free-rider and encouragement eects. Sec-
tion 8 briey analyses strategic experimentation in the special case with two
players and no discounting. Section 9 discusses mixed strategies. Section
10 characterizes symmetric equilibria in the general case with many players
and discounting. Section 11 gives the comparative statics of the strategic
problem. Section 12 shows that our mixed-strategy equilibria can also be
interpreted as public-randomization equilibria. Section 13 explains how our
model can be generalized to the case where the payo of the unknown ac-
tion can take on many values (rather than just two), and where players may
observe more than one signal.
2 The Model
There are N identical innitely lived risk-neutral players. At time t, each
player i chooses between two actions:
 a `safe' action, with payo di (t) = s dt +  dZi (t), and
 a `risky' action, with payo di (t) = dt +  dZi (t).
These choices are made simultaneously and independently. All players then
observe all actions chosen and the resulting payos. They also observe
8
 a background signal d0 (t) =
p
 dt +  dZ0 (t).
Here:
 s is xed and known;
  2 f`; hg is unknown;
 ` < s < h;
  > 0 is the quality of the background signal;
 the dZi (t) are independently and normally distributed with mean 0
and variance dt for 0  i  N .
Player i's objective is to maximize the expectation of the present discounted







where r > 0 is the discount rate.
In this model player i observes the background signal d0 (t) and the
payos dj (t) of all players j including herself. The background signal d0 (t)
is composed of the deterministic contribution
p
 dt and the stochastic shock
 dZ0 (t). The rst contribution ensures that it conveys some information
about . The second ensures that this information is noisy. The payo
dj (t) of player j conveys no information in the case where player j plays
safe. In the case where player j plays risky, dj (t) conveys noisy information
about . Since the background signal is always observed, player i always
obtains some information. Hence she will eventually learn the value of 
more or less exactly, and incomplete learning cannot occur in this model.
The problem is, rather, to determine how quickly players learn the value of
.
3 The Filtering Problem
In order to characterize the optimal experimentation policy of a single player
or of the team of N players it is helpful to determine how the players' com-
mon belief p (t) that  is high evolves as more information about  becomes
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available. One of the advantages of our continuous-time formulation is that
it is possible to give a simple answer to this question.
Let 0 denote the safe action, let 1 denote the risky action, and let xi 2
f0; 1g denote the action taken by player i. In other words, let xi denote
the amount of experimentation undertaken by player i. Let p (t) denote the
prior belief that  is high at the outset of instant t, let p (t+ dt) denote the
posterior belief that  is high at the conclusion of instant t, and let
dp (t) = p (t+ dt)  p (t)
denote the change in beliefs concerning . Finally, let
 (p) =
 






Then we have the following lemma.











Note rst that beliefs can be expected to follow a martingale. In other
words, the expectation of p (t+ dt) conditional on current information should
be p (t). Or, equivalently, the expectation of dp (t) conditional on current
information should be 0. Lemma 1 conrms that this is indeed the case.
Secondly, the better the information received about , the higher the variance
of the posterior should be. In particular, the variance of the posterior should
be higher: the higher the quality  of the background signal; the larger the
number
PN
i=1 xi of players experimenting; and the higher the signal-to-noise
ratio h `

. Lemma 1 conrms these intuitions too. Finally, Lemma 1 makes
clear that the posterior is unchanged from the prior when there is already
certainty as to which state of the world obtains, i.e. whenever p 2 f0; 1g.
Proof. Players observe the background signal
d0 (t) =
q
 dt +  dZ0 (t) ;
and the payos
di (t) = ((1   xi) s+ xi) dt+  dZi (t)
for 1  i  N . These signals are observationally equivalent to the signals
dei (t) = xi e dt+ dZi (t)
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for 0  i  N , where x0 =
p
 and e =  s

.
Now e takes the values è= ` s

and eh = h s

with probabilities (1   p)
and p, and the dZi (t) are independently and normally distributed with mean
0 and variance dt. Hence, applying Bayes' Rule, we obtain




eh+ (1   p (t))F è ;
where




(dei (t)  xi e dt)2
!




 eF eh  eF è
p eF eh+ (1   p) eF è ;









and where we have suppressed dependence on t.
Next,



















(since deidej = dt if i = j and deidej = 0 if i 6= j). Hence
dp =
p (1  p)
eh   èPNi=0 xi dei
1 +
PN
i=0 xi ew (p) dei
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(where ew (p) = (1   p) è+ peh)
= p (1  p)







xi ew (p) dei
!
(neglecting terms of order dt
3
2 )
= p (1   p)




x2i ew (p) dt
!
(noting once again that deidej = dt if i = j and deidej = 0 if i 6= j)





(where d eZi = dei   xi ew (p) dt).
Finally, the expectation of d eZi conditional on the information available
to the players at time t is 0, and d eZid eZj = dt if i = j and d eZid eZj = 0 if
i 6= j. That is, the prole eZ = Ni=0 eZi follows a standard (N + 1)-dimensional
Wiener process relative to the players' information. Hence dp has mean 0
and variance 
p (1   p)





Recalling that x0 =
p
, that xi 2 f0; 1g, that è= ` s and that eh = h s , we
obtain the required conclusion.
4 The Team Problem
Suppose that the players act as a team. Then the problem reduces to that
of choosing the number n 2 f0; 1; :::; Ng of experiments to maximize the
average payo. If n experiments are chosen, then the change in beliefs
dp  N [0; ( + n) (p) dt] .









where w (p) = (1   p) ` + p h is the expectation, given current information,
of the ow payo from the risky arm. The optimal experimentation problem
therefore reduces to the problem of controlling the variance of the diusion
process p. The latter problem is amenable to the techniques of dynamic
programming.
Lemma 2 The value function u : [0; 1] ! R for the team problem is the



















where we have suppressed the dependence of , u and w on p.
In particular,























since  (0) =  (1) = 0.
Proof. Suppose that the current belief is p 2 [0; 1], that n members of the
team experiment, and that continuation payos are given by c : [0; 1] ! R.











and the payo from the remainder of time is
e r dt c(p + dp).
Now
e r dt = 1   r dt
and





Moreover dp is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance ( + n) (p) dt.





= ( + n) (p) dt, and the expectation of the
continuation payo is





c00(p) ( + n) (p) dt

. (3)
Adding (2) and (3) we obtain the expectation of the overall payo, namely


















where we have dropped terms of order (dt)2. Finally, the value function u for
the team problem is, as usual, the unique bounded solution of the Bellman
equation
u (p) = max
n2f0;1;:::;Ng
H (n; p; u ()) for all p 2 [0; 1] :
It is easy to see that this equation reduces to (1).
In a discrete-time setting, the Bellman equation states that the current
payo is equal to the maximum over the control variable of the expectation
of the current payo plus the discounted value of the continuation payo. In
the present, continuous-time, setting:
 u is the current payo;
 n is the control variable;





w is the expectation of the current ow payo;
 1
r
is the discount factor;




is the expectation of the rate of change of the continuation
payo.
The Bellman equation therefore states that the current payo is the maxi-
mum over the control variable of the expectation of the current ow payo
plus the discounted value of the rate of change of the continuation payo.
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is the discount rate;





is the shadow value of information;
 s  w is the opportunity cost of experimentation.






as the shadow value of experimentation, and the Bellman equation tells us
that we should maximize experimentation if the shadow value of experimen-
tation exceeds its opportunity cost, and minimize experimentation otherwise.
Remark 1 One might have expected that experimentation would take place
if and only if the posterior is suciently high. This is not immediately ap-
parent from the present formulation of the Bellman equation. It is, however,
immediate from the alternative formulation introduced below.
Remark 2 One might also have expected to see levels of experimentation
intermediate between 0 and N . However, in the continuous-time setting con-
sidered here, the marginal value of an additional experiment is constant. This
seems to be because the time interval dt during which the team experiments
is innitesimal.
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5 Alternative Formulation of the Bellman Equa-
tion
There are several dierent ways of formulating the Bellman equation for the
team problem. In this section we introduce an alternative formulation to the
one given above, which yields further insight into the team problem.
Lemma 3 The value function u : [0; 1] ! R for the team problem is the




















Lemma 3 tells us that the optimal-experimentation problem is equivalent
to a randomized-stopping problem. In this problem:
 all payos are measured relative to the safe payo s;
 there is no discounting;
 the state variable p evolves according to the equation dp  N [0;(p) dt]
until such time as the process is stopped;
 the ow payo  r (s  w)
N
is obtained up to the point at which the
process is stopped;
 the process is stopped with probability r
 + n
per unit time;




In other words, r times the social opportunity cost of experimentation s w
N
is
incurred up to the time at which the process is stopped. A lump-sum benet
equal to the value of the background information  in terms of the social
opportunity cost of experimentation is then obtained.
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Lemma 3 also tells us that the optimal policy for this randomized-stopping
problem is given by:
n =
8>><>>:









Since u  s increases strictly from 0 to h  s as p increases from 0 to 1, and
s   w decreases strictly from s   ` to s   h as p increases from 0 to 1, this
implies that there is a unique cuto C 2 (0; b) such that n = 0 if p < C
and n = N if p > C, where b is the break-even point at which s  w = 0.
(C.f. Lemma 4 below.)






































Now, if the maximum of a function is zero, then the maximum and the set
of maximizers is unchanged if the function is divided through by any other
function, provided only that the second function is strictly positive. We may
therefore divide the maximand in the latter equation by +n
r
. Doing so yields
(4).
Remark 3 In a discrete-time setting, we would expect to nd a sequence
of cutos C1, C2, ..., CN such that n players experiment i Cn < p <
C(n+1). Our main reason for expecting this is that, in a discrete-time set-
ting, the marginal information from an additional experiment is decreasing
in n (the number of players experimenting), while the marginal cost of exper-
imentation is independent of n. We would therefore expect to see an interior
solution for the number of players who play the risky action, at least for some
values of p.
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Remark 4 One can solve explicitly for u and C. Let
1 =
vuut1 + 8r2
(h   `)2 , 2 =
vuut1 + 8r2
( +N)(h  `)2 ;
u1 (p) = p
(1+1)=2 (1   p) (1 1)=2 and u2(p) = p (2 1)=2 (1  p)(2+1)=2.
Then
C =
( N + 1 + ( +N) 2)(s  `)





 (s  w (C))
N u1 (C)
u1 (p) for p 2 [0; C]
w (p) +
( +N) (s  w (C))
N u2 (C)
u2 (p) for p 2 [C; 1]
9>>>=>>>; :
This completely characterizes the team solution.
6 Comparative Statics of the Team Problem
In this section we briey describe how the team value function and the team
cuto change with the discount rate, the number of agents in the team and
the quality of background information.
Let b denote the break-even point at which s  w = 0, let
u1 (p) = maxfs;w (p)g
denote the myopic payo, and let
u0 (p) = (1   p) s+ p h
denote the full-information payo. Then we have the following simple lemma.
Lemma 4 For all p 2 (0; 1):
(i) u1 (p) < u (p) < u0 (p);
18
(ii) u00 (p) > 0.
In other words: the possibility of learning about the payo of the risky
arm allows the team to obtain a payo strictly greater than the myopic pay-
o; the impossibility of learning the payo of the risky arm instantaneously
prevents the team from attaining the full-information payo; and the value
of information, as measured by the second derivative of the value function,
is strictly positive as long as there is some uncertainty concerning the payo
of the risky arm.
Proof. The weak versions of the inequalities in the statement of the lemma
are all easy consequences of the optimal-experimentation formulation of our
problem. We begin by sketching these arguments. Note rst that one
valid strategy is always to play safe. This yields the payo s. Another
valid strategy is always to play risky. This yields the payo w. Hence
u  maxfs;wg = u1. Secondly, any strategy that can be played when
there is incomplete information can also be played when there is complete
information. Hence u must be less than or equal to the full-information
payo u0. Finally, the payo from any given strategy is linear in the prior p.
Hence the value function, which is the upper envelope of such payos, must
be convex in p.
Let us turn now to the strict inequalities. Consider the myopic strategy
of putting n = 0 if p < b and n = N if p  b. The value u of this strategy is
















if p  b
9>>=>>; :
It is easy to check that u  u1, with strict inequality on (0; 1). Since
u  u, it follows that u  u1, with strict inequality on (0; 1). Next, the















Since u  u1, with strict inequality on (0; 1), it follows that u00  0, with
strict inequality on (0; 1). Thirdly, the ow payo associated with any strat-
egy is at most u0. Since u0 is linear, it follows that the overall payo u
19
associated with any strategy is also at most u0. Hence u  u0. Finally,
suppose for a contradiction that u (p) = u0 (p) for some p 2 (0; 1). Then
u   u0 is maximized at p, and therefore 0  (u   u0)00 (p) = u00 (p). This is
the required contradiction.
Using Lemma 4, one can establish the following comparative statics re-
sults for the equilibrium payo.
Theorem 5 For all p 2 (0; 1):
(i) u (p) is strictly decreasing in r, u (p)! u0 (p) as r ! 0, and u (p)!
u1 (p) as r !1;
(ii) u (p) is strictly increasing in , and u (p)! u0 (p) as  !1;
(iii) u (p) is strictly increasing in N , and u (p)! u0 (p) as N !1.
One can also establish the following results for the optimal cuto.
Theorem 6 Let C denote the optimal cuto. Then:
(i) C is strictly increasing in r,
C ! (s   `)
(s  `) + ( +N)(h   s)
as r! 0, and C ! b as r!1;
(ii) C is strictly increasing in , and C ! b as  !1;
(iii) C is strictly decreasing in N , and C ! 0 as N !1.
Notice that C does not converge to 0 as r ! 0. Rather, it converges to
the optimal cuto for the undiscounted case. It does, of course, converge to
the break-even point b as r !1.
These comparative statics results for u and C can be derived directly
from the explicit formulae given in Remark 4. A better approach, however,
is to derive them from more general qualitative considerations. For example,
the fact that C is strictly increasing in  | which is not completely obvious
| can be derived as follows.
20
Note rst that
u (C () ; )  s =
















In other words, increasing  has a direct and an indirect eect. The di-
rect eect is captured by the term s w(C)
N
in the numerator. According to
this eect, increasing  will tend to raise C and thereby lower experimenta-
tion. This is a free-rider eect. The indirect eect is captured by the term
 @u(C;)
@
in the numerator. According to this eect, increasing  will tend
to raise u. This in turn reduces C, and thereby raises experimentation.
This is an encouragement eect.





















In other words, @u
@
is the expectation of the present discounted value of the
















if p < C
u  w
 +N
if p > C
9>>=>>; :
Now, u   s is non-negative, convex, and (u   s) (0) = 0. Similarly, u   w





C, at which point it takes the value
u (C () ; )   s

=
u (C () ; )  w (C ())
 +N
=









> 0. In other words, the direct eect out-
weighs the indirect eect, and experimentation falls with the quality of back-
ground information.
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7 The Free-Rider Eect and the Encourage-
ment Eect
We begin our analysis of strategic experimentation by considering how a
player's best response varies with variations in the strategies of the other
players. For this purpose, it suces to consider the case of a single player
facing non-uniform background information. Indeed, from the point of view
of any given individual, the background information and the experimentation
of the other players can be regarded as non-uniform background information.
Suppose accordingly that the variation of background information with p
is described by the function  : [0; 1]! (0;1), and suppose for concreteness
that
 (p) = (1   )  (p) +   (p) ,
where   . Let u (p;) denote the player's value function and let
 =
u   s
s  w   :
Then, applying the appropriate analogue of (5), we nd that the player's
best response is given by:
n (p;) =
8><>:
= 0 if  < 0
2 f0; 1g if  = 0
= 1 if  > 0
9>=>; .














In other words, changes in  have two eects. The rst is a free-rider eect:
extra background information, which is supplied free, is used as a substi-
tute for information which would otherwise have had to be supplied at an
opportunity cost. The second is an encouragement eect: supplying extra
information encourages the player to increase experimentation in order to
bring forward the time at which the extra information becomes available.
An illustrative example may help to get a better grasp of the latter eect.
Suppose that the player is initially indierent between experimenting or not
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given his prior belief p, and that there is no background information at all.
Suppose now that he is told that another player will begin to experiment in
the future whenever the prior moves above the break-even point. The fact
that another player may contribute more information in the future gives a
strict incentive to experiment to the initial player, since by experimenting
the player now gets strictly more information than if the other player was not
around. Indeed, if he did not experiment the prior would not move | since
there is no background information | and he would not be able to benet
from the potential information provided by the future experimentation of the
other player.
8 Strategic Experimentation: The Undiscounted
Case
This section deals with the special case of our model in which there is no
discounting. This case is easy to analyze. Indeed, it is possible to get an
explicit characterization of both the team and the strategic solutions. In
particular, we obtain a clear idea of the consequences of free riding for the
strategic solution. This simplicity is, unfortunately, obtained at a cost: in
the absence of discounting, there is no encouragement eect.
When there is no discounting, players evaluate outcomes according to
the overtaking criterion. In order to understand what this involves, note rst
that, by exploiting the background information, player i can always ensure











is equal to the full-information payo u0(p0) = (1  p0)s+ p0h. For example,
she can choose the risky arm i p exceeds the break-even probability b. Her


















((1  xi) s+ xiw(p(t))  u0(p(t))) dt

: (6)
Note that player i's transient payo is non-positive, and that it may be
negatively innite.
Proof. We have E [di(t)] = (1  xi) s + xiw(p(t)), where xi 2 f0; 1g is






  Tu0(p0) = E
"Z T
0




(1  xi) s+ xiw(p(t))  u0(p(t))  0:
Letting T ! 1 and applying the monotone convergence theorem, we con-
clude that player i's transient payo exists. (It may be negatively innite.)
8.1 The Team Problem
Like the discounted team problem, the undiscounted team problem can be
viewed as a controlled-variance problem. It can therefore be handled using
dynamic programming.
Lemma 8 The value function v : [0; 1] ! R for the undiscounted team




















((1  xi) s+ xiw(p(t))  u0(p(t))) dt

:














w (p)   u0(p(t));
where n =
PN
i=1 xi. Now, if the current belief is p, and if n players experi-
ment, then the change in beliefs
dp  N [0; ( + n) (p) dt]
as before. Arguing as in the proof of Lemma 2, then, we nd that the value
function v : [0; 1] ! R for the undiscounted team problem is the unique
bounded solution of (7).
Furthermore, arguing as in the proof of Lemma 3, we arrive at a randomized-
stopping formulation for (7).
Lemma 9 The value function v : [0; 1] ! R for the undiscounted team





































N (h  s) + (h   `) : (9)
It is notable just how much simpler the analysis has become in the absence of
discounting: the optimal cuto can be calculated without rst solving for the
value function v. The same short cut works in the strategic case, enabling
us easily to characterize the set of Markov equilibria.
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8.2 The Strategic Problem
We assume for simplicity that there are only two players.
Denition 1 A mixed (Markov) strategy for player i is a mapping Xi :
[0; 1]! [0; 1].
A mixed strategy for player i species the probability with which he will
choose to experiment in each state. (Pure strategies are the special case of
mixed strategies in which players are required to experiment with probability
0 or 1 in all states.)
We discuss mixed strategies more extensively in the next section. Here
we simply note that, when the player j employs the mixed strategy Xj , the























Equation (10) is identical to equation (7), except that N has been replaced
by 1,  has been replaced by +Xj and xi has been replaced byXi. Similarly,
equation (11) is identical to equation (8), except that N has been replaced
by 1,  has been replaced by  +Xj and xi has been replaced by Xi.










= (0; 0) if 0 < 0 and p < b
2 f(0; 1) ; (1; 0) ; (0; 0)g if 0 2 [0; 1] and p < b
= (1; 1) if 0 > 1 or p  b
9>=>; :
Notice that 0 increases strictly from   to +1 as p increases from 0 to
b. Hence there are unique cutos 0 < C1 < C2 < b such that 0 = 0 at C1
and 0 = 1 at C2. It is easy to check that
C1 =
 (s  `)
(h  s) + (h   `) (12)
and
C2 =
( + 1) (s  `)
(h  s) + ( + 1) (h  `) : (13)
In particular, comparing (12) with (9), we see that C < C1.
In any pure-strategy equilibrium, neither player chooses the risky action
when p < C1, exactly one player chooses the risky action when p 2 (C1; C2),
and both players choose the risky action when p > C2. In particular, com-
pared with the socially ecient outcome, two players too few experiment
when p 2 (C; C1), and one player too few experiments when p 2 (C1; C2).
Because of free riding, equilibriumexperimentation in any pure-strategy equi-
librium is strictly less than would be socially ecient.
There are many pure-strategy equilibria. In one equilibrium, player 1
chooses the risky action for all p 2 (C1; C2) and player 2 free rides on player
1's experimentation in this range. In another equilibrium, the roles of the
players are reversed. We refer to these two extreme asymmetric equilibria as
pioneer-follower equilibria. More generally, from any partition of the interval
(C1; C2) into two (measurable) subsets S1and S2, one can construct a pure-
strategy equilibrium such that player 1 puts x1 = 1 and player 2 puts x2 = 0
when p 2 S1 and vice versa when p 2 S2. All these pure-strategy equilibria
induce the same amount of total experimentation. They dier only in the
allocation of the costs of experimentation between the two players.
There is, however, only one symmetric equilibrium. In this equilibrium,
the players experiment with probability 0 for p  C1, with probability rising
continuously from 0 to 1 as p rises from C1 to C2, and with probability
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1 for p  C2. As in the pure-strategy equilibria, then, there is too little
experimentation for p < C2. Notice, however, that the symmetric equilibrium
involves more experimentation than the pure-strategy equilibria when p is
near C2, and less experimentation than the pure-strategy equilibria when
p is near C1. Hence, in order to maximize experimentation, exactly one













Proof. Consider equation (11). When p  b, (s   w)  0 and (u0   s)  0
with at least one strict inequality, so that it is a dominant strategy for player
i to choose Xi = 1. When p < b, equation (11) reduces to










This tells us that player i should experiment if Xj < 0 and play safe if
Xj > 0, and that she will be indierent between the two actions if Xj = 0.
More explicitly, for p < b, we have
(X1;X2)
8><>:
= (0; 0) if 0 < 0
2 f(0; 1); (1; 0)g if 0  0  1




Play in any given period of a discrete-time stochastic game involves a well
established order of events. At the beginning of the period, players simul-
taneously and independently choose possibly random actions. They then
obtain payos depending on the current state and the realized prole of ac-
tions. Finally, a new state is chosen according to a distribution that depends
on the current state and the realized prole of actions. In continuous time, it
is possible to establish an analogous order of events, and thereby to attach a
meaning to randomization. This is the approach that we adopt in the present
section.
Suppose accordingly that the current belief is p 2 [0; 1] and that player i
uses the mixed action Xi. Suppose too that, in any given period:
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(i) each player i chooses xi = 0 with probability 1  Xi and xi = 1 with
probability Xi, the choices being made simultaneously and indepen-
dently;
(ii) each player i receives the payo r ((1  xi) s + xi ) dt;
(iii) the background signal d0 (t) =
p
 dt +  dZ0 (t) and the payos
di (t) = ((1   xi) s+ xi) dt+  dZi (t) are realized;
(iv) the players all observe the actions xi for 1  i  N and the payos
di (t) for 0  i  N ;
(v) a new belief p+ dp is generated.
Suppose nally that player i's continuation payos are given by ci : [0; 1]!
R.
Then, arguing as in Sections 3 and 4, one would expect that the expec-
tation of player i's payo conditional on the prole of actions x = Ni=1xi
would be
r dt









The unconditional expectation of her payo would therefore be
Hi (Xi;X i; p; ci ()) =
r dt









whereX i = j 6=iXj . Finally, her value function ui () when the other players
use the mixed-strategy prole X i would be the unique bounded solution of
the Bellman equation
ui (p) = max
Xi2[0;1]
Hi (Xi;X i (p) ; p; ci ()) for all p 2 [0; 1] :
We are therefore led to the following denition.
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Denition 2 The value function ui : [0; 1]! R for player i when the other













Several aspects of this denition are worthy of comment. First, in the
case where the players other than i use pure strategies and player i connes
herself to best responses that are pure strategies, equation (14) can be derived
instead of assumed. More explicitly, the value function ui () of player i when
the other players use the pure-strategy prole x i = j 6=ixj can be shown to
be the unique bounded solution of the Bellman equation
ui = max
xi2f0;1g









This equation should be compared with equation (1). The only dierence
between the two equations is that, in (15), N has been replaced by 1 and 
has been replaced by  +
P
j 6=i xj.
Secondly, although we have chosen to assume rather than derive equation
(14), we believe that it is in principle possible to derive it. To do so, it
would be necessary rst to build a mathematical framework within which
the mixed extension of our game can be formulated, and then to derive (14)
from this formulation. This is, in eect, a more elaborate version of the
old problem of nding a mathematical framework within which it is possible
to derive the result that the empirical distribution of a continuum of i.i.d.
random variables is equal to the population distribution with probability one.
Building such a mathematical framework is beyond the scope of the present
paper.
Thirdly, although we ultimately assume equation (14), we have oered a
heuristic derivation. We hope that this derivation will help to motivate our
denition.
Fourthly, note that equation (14) diers from equation (15) only in that
xj has been replaced with Xj for all j. This is a result of the additive
separability of the payo of player i in the xj. This additive separability
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turns out to have a second consequence: the mixed extension of our game is
strategically equivalent to the public-randomization extension of our game.
Hence the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria that we analyze below can
also be interpreted as symmetric public-randomization equilibria in which
players either all experiment or all play safe. See Section 12 below.
Finally, just as equation (1) has the alternative randomized-stopping for-
mulation (4), so (14) has the randomized-stopping formulation given in the
following lemma.
Lemma 11 The value function ui : [0; 1] ! R for player i when the other





















Note that equation (16) is identical to equation (4) except in that N has
been replaced by 1,  has been replaced by  +
P
j 6=iXj and xi has been
replaced by Xi.
Remark 5 According to the perspective on randomization in continuous-
time developed in this section, play of a period of a continuous-time stochastic
game involves exactly the same sequence of events as play of a period of a
discrete-time stochastic game. It is also true that, in both cases, there is a
well dened rst period, and that the set of periods is totally ordered. The
dierence between the two cases consists in the fact that, in continuous time,
the set of periods is not well ordered. In particular, in continuous time, it
is not the case that there is a well dened period immediately following any
other period. It is not therefore possible to build up the path that results from
a prole of strategies inductively.
Remark 6 It is possible to give an alternative interpretation to the strategies
Xi. According to this interpretation, the players divide their time between
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experimenting and not experimenting. Thus Xi is the proportion of time that
player i devotes to experimenting, and 1  Xi is the proportion of time she
devotes to not experimenting. See Harris [12].
10 Strategic Experimentation: the Discounted
Case
In this section we tackle the discounted case. This case is harder to analyze
than the undiscounted case, but it exhibits the encouragement eect. We
focus throughout on symmetric equilibria.
Our rst objective is to obtain a partial characterization of equilibrium
experimentation. To this end, we prove the following lemma, which is a
simple generalization of Lemma 4.
Lemma 12 Suppose that player j chooses the mixed strategyXj for all j 6= i,
and that player i plays a best response to j 6=iXj . Let ui denote player i's
value function. Then, for all p 2 (0; 1):
(i) u1 (p) < ui (p) < u0 (p);
(ii) u00i (p) > 0.
Proof. Let u (; r;N; ) denote the value function for the team prob-
lem with discount rate r, N players and background information . Then
ui  u (; r; 1; ) since Pj 6=iXj  0, and ui  u (; r; 1;  +N   1) sinceP
j 6=iXj  N   1. Part (i) therefore follows from part (i) of Lemma 4. Next,
















j 6=iXj + 1
)
:
Part (ii) therefore follows from part (i).
The partial characterization of equilibrium experimentation is then con-
tained in the following theorem, which should be compared with Theorem
10.
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Theorem 13 Suppose that Xy is a symmetric equilibrium, and let uy be the







0 if y < 0 and p < b
y
N   1 if y 2 [0; N   1] and p < b
1 if y > N   1 or p  b
9>>=>>>; :
Note that Lemma 12 shows that y increases strictly from   to +1 as
p increases from 0 to b. Hence there are unique cutos 0 < C1 < CN < b
such that y = 0 at C1 and y = N   1 at CN . In particular, equilibrium
experimentation Xy is 0 for p 2 [0; C1], increases strictly from 0 to 1 as p
increases from C1 to CN , and is 1 for p  CN . Lemma 12 even shows that y
is strictly convex on [0; b]. Hence Xy is convex on [0; CN ], and strictly convex
on [C1; CN ].
Note too that it follows from (5) that the team cuto C is the unique






Moreover u  uy (because a team can always undertake the same amount
of experimentation as is undertaken in equilibrium), and 
N
< . Hence
C < C1. In particular, because of free riding, equilibrium experimentation
is strictly less than would be socially ecient.
Note nally that the characterization of equilibrium experimentation Xy
given in Theorem 13 is partial because it depends on uy, which is itself
endogenous. (We do, of course, know several properties of uy.) This contrasts
with the characterization of equilibrium experimentation given in Theorem
10, which was completely explicit since it depended only on u0.






























y =  + (N   1)Xy: (19)
Now suppose that p < b. Then there are three possibilities.




   = uy s
s w
  y = uy s y(s w)s w < 0.




(19). Hence Xy =
y
N 1
and y = (N   1)Xy 2 [0; N   1].
(iii) If uy s > y (s w) then Xy = 1 from (17). Hence y = +N 1 from





 y+N 1 = uy s y(s w)s w +N 1 > N 1.
If, on the other hand, p  b, then Lemma 12 implies that s   w  0 and
uy   s  0 with at least one strict inequality. Hence Xy = 1 from (17).
By developing Theorem 13 a little further, we obtain a characterization of
the set of value functions of symmetric equilibria which does not involve any
reference to the associated strategies. This characterization is of intrinsic in-
terest. It could also form the basis for an approach to proving the uniqueness
of equilibrium.
For all p, u such that p 2 [0; 1] and u 2 [u1 (p) ; u0 (p)], let
A (p; u) =
u  s
s  w (p)   ;
and let
T (p; u) =
8>>><>>>:
0 if A (p; u) < 0 and p < b
NA (p; u)
N   1 if A (p; u) 2 [0; N   1] and p < b
N if A (p; u) > N   1 or p  b
9>>>=>>>;
:
Here A (p; u) should be thought of as the incentive to experiment when the
belief is p and the continuation payo is u, and T (p; u) should be thought
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of as total experimentation in the same case. Then we have the following
corollary of Theorem 13.
Corollary 14 uy is the value function of a symmetric equilibrium i uy is a
bounded solution of














where we have suppressed the dependence of T on p.
The characterization the set of value functions of symmetric equilibria
contained in Corollary 14 allows us to nd the set of all symmetric equilibria
by means of a two-step procedure: rst nd all solutions uy of (20), then
calculate the associated strategies Xy. More explicitly, we have the following
second corollary to Theorem 13.
Corollary 15 Xy is a symmetric equilibrium i there exists a solution uy of
(20) such that Xy (p) = T (p; uy (p)) for all p 2 [0; 1].
In particular, a good approach to the uniqueness of equilibrium would be
to show that (20) has a unique solution.
Proof of Corollary 14. Suppose that uy is the value function of the
symmetric equilibrium Xy. Combining (17), (18) and (19), we have
0 =  r (s  w)+ r
 +NXy





Writing  + (N   1)Xy in the form N + N 1N ( +NXy), we get














Moreover NXy = T (uy) by Theorem 13. Hence (20) is satised.




Then, reversing the argument of the previous paragraph, we see that (21)
holds. Moreover Xy = 0 if uy   s <  (s  w) and p < b, and Xy = 1 if
uy s >  (s w) and p < b. That is, Xy is a best response for player i when
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the other players choose Xy, and when player i is constrained to experiment
whenever p  b. To complete the proof, then, we need only show that the
constraint on experimentation for p  b is not binding. This follows at once
from Lemma 12, which implies that , for all optimal strategies X in the
unconstrained problem, X = 1 for p  b.
Proof of Corollary 15. The corollary follows immediately from Theo-
rem 13 and Corollary 14.
We have already seen that our experimentation game is not a supermodu-
lar game: even in a two-player game, increasing the level of experimentation
of one player in all states may lead the other player to increase experimenta-
tion in some states and to decrease experimentation in other states. This is
because, roughly speaking, current experimentation by one player is a strate-
gic substitute for current experimentation by another, but future experimen-
tation by one player is a strategic complement for current experimentation
by another.
As a result, we cannot establish existence by applying Tarski's xed-
point theorem to the best-response mapping. We can, however, exploit the
encouragement eect to arrive at an increasing mapping to which we can
apply Tarski's theorem. More precisely, we know that
 a player's payo from her best response is increasing in the total ex-
perimentation of the other players.
Moreover Theorem 13 tells us that
 a player's level of experimentation is increasing in her payo.
We may therefore construct an increasing map in the space of value functions.
Applying Tarski's xed-point theorem to this mapping, we can establish the
existence of a maximum symmetric equilibrium.
Note that there are some grounds for believing that our model possesses
a unique symmetric equilibrium. We do not, however, have a complete proof
of this, and we must therefore admit the possibility of multiple equilibria.
Denition 3 Suppose that u and bu are the value functions of two symmetric
equilibria. Then the rst equilibrium dominates the second if u(p)  bu(p)
for all p 2 [0; 1].
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Denition 4 An equilibrium is maximum symmetric if it is symmetric
and it dominates all other symmetric equilibria.
We use the terminology `maximum' rather than `maximal' in order to
stress that the equilibrium that we nd dominates all other equilibria rather
than simply being undominated.
Theorem 16 There exists a maximum symmetric equilibrium.
We denote the value function of a representative player in the maximum
symmetric equilibrium by u#.
Proof. For all p 2 [0; 1] and all u 2 [u1 (p) ; u0 (p)], let
 (p; u) =
8><>:
 if A (p; u) < 0 and p < b
 +A (p; u) if A (p; u) 2 [0; N   1] and p < b
 +N   1 if A (p; u) > N   1 or p  b
9>=>; :
Here  (p; u) should be thought of as the total information available to a
player | i.e. as background information plus total experimentation by the
other players | when the belief is p and the continuation payo is u.
Let U denote the set of functions u : [0; 1] ! [s; h] such that: (i) u1 
u  u0; and (ii) u is convex. For all u 2 U , let 1 (u) : [0; 1]! [0;  +N   1]
be dened by (1 (u)) (p) =  (p; u (p)) for all p 2 [0; 1], and for all  : [0; 1]!
[0;  +N   1], let 2 () 2 U be the value function of the one-player when
background information is . Finally, let  = 2  1. Then it is easy to see
that: (i) U is closed under the operation of taking pointwise maxima; (ii)  is
a self-map of U ; and (iii)  is non-decreasing in the sense that u  bu pointwise
implies that  (u)   (bu) pointwise. (Notice that U is not a lattice, since
it is not closed under the operation of taking pointwise minima.) The proof
of Tarski's xed-point theorem therefore shows that  possesses a maximum
xed point. We denote this xed point by u#.
In order to show that there exists a maximum symmetric equilibrium,
then, it suces to show that uy is the value function of a symmetric equilib-
rium i uy is a xed point of .




. By construction, uy is the value function of player i when all
players j 6= i employ Xy, and player i chooses a best response. Hence, in
order to show that uy is the value function of a symmetric equilibrium, we
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need only show that Xy is a best response for player i when all players j 6= i
employ Xy. Put y =
uy s
s w
  . If p < b then:
(i) If y < 0 then y =  by denition of 1. Hence Xy = 0 and uy   s =
(y + ) (s  w) = (y + y) (s  w) < y (s  w).
(ii) If y 2 [0; N   1] then y = +y by denition of 1. HenceXy = yN 1
and uy  s = (y + ) (s w) = y (s  w).
(iii) If y > N   1 then y =  + N   1 by denition of 1. Hence Xy = 1
and uy  s = (y + ) (s w) > (N   1 + ) (s  w) > y (s  w).
If, on the other hand, p  b, then uy  s  0 and s w  0 with at least one
strict inequality, and therefore uy   s > y (s w). Overall, then, Xy = 0
whenever uy   s < y (s  w) and Xy = 1 whenever uy   s > y (s  w).
That is, Xy is a best response to Xy.
Suppose nally that Xy is a symmetric equilibrium, and let uy be the
associated value function. Put y =  + (N   1)Xy. Then uy = 2 (y) by
denition of 2. Moreover y = 1 (uy) by Theorem 13.
11 Comparative Statics of the Strategic Prob-
lem
In this section we examine the comparative statics of the maximum symmet-
ric equilibrium with respect to the discount rate r, the number of players N
and the level of background information .
Theorem 17 For all p 2 (0; 1):
(i) u# (p) is strictly decreasing in r, u# (p) ! u0 (p) as r ! 0, and
u# (p)! u1 (p) as r!1;
(ii) u# (p) is strictly increasing in N , and u# (p) is bounded away from
u0 (p) as N !1;
(iii) u# (p) is strictly increasing in , and u# (p)! u0 (p) as  !1.
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Notice that what is remarkable about the comparative-statics results of
Theorem 17 is not their sign, but rather the fact that they hold at all in a
strategic problem. Notice too that the full-information payo is not obtained
even in the limit as N ! 1. This underlines the strength of the free-rider
eect in our model.
Proof. The monotonicity results follow as corollaries of the existence con-
struction. In the case of r: 1 is independent of r; and (2 ()) (p) is strictly
decreasing in r for p 2 (0; 1). In the case of N : (1 ()) (p) is non-decreasing
in N , and strictly increasing for p 2 [b; 1]; and 2 is independent of N . In
the case of : (1 ()) (p) is non-decreasing in , and strictly increasing for
p 2 [b; 1]; and 2 is independent of .
The limit results in parts (i) and (iii) can be deduced from the corre-
sponding results for the team problem. Let u (; r;N; ) denote the value
function for the team problem with discount rate r, N players and back-
ground information . Since u (p; r; 1; )  u# (p)  u0 (p) and u (; r; 1; )
converges uniformly to u0 as r ! 0 and as  ! 1, u# too converges uni-
formly to u0 as r ! 0 and as  ! 1. Similarly, since u1 (p)  u# (p) 
u (p; r; 1;  +N   1) and u (; r; 1;  +N   1) converges uniformly to u1 as
r!1, u# too converges uniformly to u1 as r!1.
As for the limit result in part (ii), we let C1 be the unique solution of the
equation u0 (p)  s =  (s  w (p)), as in (12) above. Since u#  u0, we must
have X# = 0 for p < C1. Hence u# (p)  u (p; r; 1;), where
 =
(
 if p < C1
 +N   1 if p  C1
)
;
and u (; r; 1;) is the value function of the one-player problem with non-
uniform background information . Now it is easy to check that u (p; r; 1;)
is non-decreasing in N , and that it converges to the unique bounded solution






+ s  u = 0 if p < C1
u00 = 0 if p  C1
u = h if p = 1
9>>>>=>>>>;
uniformly as N !1. It is also easy to check that u < u0 on (0; 1).
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Further insight into the source of the monotonicity results can be ob-
tained by considering the equation of variations for the value function of the
maximum symmetric equilibrium. Indeed, the total information available in
the maximum symmetric equilibrium to any given player due to background





 +N   1; u#   s
s  w






















































if # 2 [0; N   1] and p < b
0 if # > N   1 or p  b
9>>>=>>>;
:
In other words, when r increases, there are two eects on a player's payo:
(i) The direct eect on her objective of the increase in r.
(ii) The indirect eect on her objective of the change induced in the be-
havior of the other players by the change in r.
The rst eect is negative: she now values the future less. The second eect
is a strategic eect: the rise in r discourages experimentation by the other
players when # 2 [0; N   1] and p < b, and this further lowers her payo.
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The eect on her objective of the change induced in her own behavior by the
change in r is of course zero by the envelope theorem. Notice the positive
feedback implicit in the second eect. This is yet another manifestation of
the encouragement eect.
A similar analysis of the cases of N and  can be undertaken. Increas-
ing N has no direct eect on a player's objective. However, it does raise
experimentation by the other players through an encouragement eect when
# 2 [0; N   1] and p < b, and through an increase in the total number
of players experimenting when # > N   1 or p  b. It also lowers per
capita experimentation by the other players through a free-rider eect when
# 2 [0; N   1] and p < b, but this decrease is exactly oset by the increase
in the number of players. Increasing  has a direct eect on the objective:
more information is provided in every state. It also has both a free-rider and
an encouragement eect when # 2 [0; N   1] and p < b. Fortunately, the
direct eect exactly osets the free-rider eect, so that the net eect when
# 2 [0; N   1] and p < b is precisely the encouragement eect.
Finally, note that there is a unique symmetric equilibriumXy when r = 0.
Total information in this equilibrium is
 +NXy =
8>>><>>>:
 if 0 < 0 and p < b
 +
N0
N   1 if 0 2 [0; N   1] and p < b







From this it follows that total information is independent of N for p < C1,
strictly decreasing in N for p 2 [C1; CN ] and strictly increasing in N for
p > CN , where
C1 =
 (s w)
(h  s) + (h   w)
and
CN =
( +N   1) (s  w)
(h   s) + ( +N   1) (h  w) :
Similarly, total information is strictly increasing in  for p < C1, strictly
decreasing in  for p 2 [C1; CN ] and strictly increasing in  for p > CN .
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In other words, total information is not in general monotonic either in the
number of players or the quantity of background information. This underlines
the subtlety of the comparative statics results given in Theorem 17.
12 Public Randomization
In this section we analyze the public-randomization extension of our game.
This extension is motivated by the idea that one way of capturing the intu-
itively natural social-experimentation pattern of taking turns is to introduce
a public-randomization device, and to have players coordinate their exper-
imentation on the basis of the realization of this device in such a way that
exactly one player experiments at any given time and each player experi-
ments with equal probability. For example, two players might toss a coin,
with player 1 experimenting if the coin comes up heads and player 2 experi-
menting if the coin comes up tails. It emerges that literally taking turns is not
an equilibrium, but that there is a wide variety of equilibria in which players
achieve equilibrium by coordinating on the basis of a public-randomization
device instead of acting independently on the basis of a private-randomization
device.
The most convenient way of characterizing the public-randomization equi-
libria of our model is to show that the mixed extension of our game is strate-
gically equivalent to its public-randomization extension. All the symmetric
mixed-strategy equilibria that we have analyzed in this paper are therefore
also symmetric public-randomization equilibria, and vice versa.
It will be helpful to begin by reformulating the notion of a mixed strategy.
For the purposes of this section, we shall take it that a mixed strategy for
player i is a mapping Xi : [0; 1]
2 ! f0; 1g. Such a strategy species the
action Xi (p; i) that player i will take when the state is p and her private
signal is i. We shall also take it that, in any given period of the mixed
extension of our game, if the current state is p then:
(i) Nature chooses a prole  = Ni=1i of private signals, the signal i
being distributed uniformly on [0; 1] and independently of all other
past, current and future private signals;
(ii) each player i observes her private signal i;
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(iii) each player i takes the action xi = Xi (p; i), the actions being chosen
simultaneously;
(iv) each player i receives payo r ((1  xi) s + xi) dt;
and so on.
Similarly, a public-randomization strategy for player i is a mapping Xi :
[0; 1]
2 ! f0; 1g. Such a strategy species the action Xi (p; ) that player i
will take when the state is p and the public signal is . We shall also take it
that, in any given period of the public-randomization extension of our game,
if the current state is p then:
(i) Nature chooses a public signal , the signal  being distributed uni-
formly on [0; 1] and independently of all other past, current and future
public signals;
(ii) each player i observes the public signal ;
(iii) each player i takes the action xi = Xi (p; ), the actions being chosen
simultaneously;
(iv) each player i receives payo r ((1  xi) s + xi) dt;
and so on.
It is immediate from these formulations of the mixed and public-randomization
extensions of our game that a strategy Xi : [0; 1]
2 ! f0; 1g can serve either as
a mixed strategy or as a public-randomization strategy. Moreover it follows
easily from the additive separability of payos in the stage game that a strat-
egy prole X = Ni=1Xi yields the same prole of payos whether it is used
as a mixed-strategy prole or as a public-randomization-strategy prole. In
other words, the mixed extension of our game and its public-randomization
extension are strategically equivalent.1 In particular, our analysis of sym-
metric mixed-strategy equilibria applies equally well to symmetric public-
randomization-strategy equilibria.
Translated into distributional terms, strategic equivalence implies that,
to each symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in which each player indepen-
dently chooses to play safe with probability 1  Xy and to experiment with
1Strategic equivalence applies to payos, but not to equilibrium paths: the equilibrium
paths of the mixed extension and the public-randomization extension may dier.
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probabilityXy, there corresponds a symmetric public-randomization-strategy
equilibrium in which players collectively choose to play safe with probability
1 Xy and to experiment with probabilityXy. The dierence between the two
equilibria is that in the former case the number of experiments is binomially





(1 Xy)N nXny , and in
the latter case the number of experiments is 0 with probability 1  Xy and
N with probability Xy. Similarly, to each symmetric public-randomization-
strategy equilibrium in which players collectively choose to play safe with
probability 1 Xy and to experiment with probability Xy, there corresponds
a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in which each player independently
chooses to play safe with probability 1  Xy and to experiment with proba-
bility Xy.
More generally, ifXy is a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, then any
joint distribution over action proles whose marginal over the action set of
player i assigns probability 1  Xy to the safe action and probability Xy to
the risky action is a public-randomization equilibrium, and vice versa. The
point is that, because payos in the stage game are additively separable in
actions, it is the total probability with which each player experiments that
matters, not the correlation between the actions of the dierent players. C.f.
Harris [12].
13 Generalization of the Theory
The theory that we have developed in this paper can be generalized in three
basic directions:
(i) the risky arm can take on an arbitrary (nite) number of values;
(ii) choice of the risky arm can generate a whole vector of signals (which
may or may not include the payo);
(iii) players can be allowed to choose between two risky arms.
The purpose of the present section is to sketch a single model that incorpo-
rates all three of these possibilities, and to outline the corresponding gener-
alization of the theory.
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13.1 The General Model
As before, there are N risk-neutral players. At time t, each player i chooses
between two arms. If she chooses arm a then she generates a payo di (t) =
wa dt and a signal vector di (t) =
p
a dt+dZi (t). These choices are made
simultaneously and independently. All players then observe all choices and
all signals. No payos are observed. Here: a 2 f1; 2g; di (t) 2 R; wa 2
fwa1; wa2; :::; waLg  R; L is the number of states of the world; di (t) 2 RK;
K is the number of signals;  2 f1; 2; :::; Lg  RK ; a > 0 is the quality
of the signal vector associated with arm a; the dZi (t) are independently and
identically distributed with distribution N [0; IK dt] for 0  i  N ; and IK
denotes the K by K identity matrix. Player i's objective is to maximize the







where r > 0 is the discount rate.
Remark 7 A background signal vector d0 (t) =
p
0 dt + dZ0 (t) with
0  0 could also be included in the model. This does not, however, involve
any real gain in generality. For example, one could simply add further signals
to each arm in an equivalent way.
Remark 8 There is no loss of generality in assuming that the components
of dZi (t) are independent and identically distributed. Indeed, suppose that
dZi (t)  N [0; V dt], where V is a positive denite K by K matrix. Then
di (t) is observationally equivalent to
V  1=2 di (t) =
q
a V  1=2dt + V  1=2 dZi (t) ;
and V  1=2 dZi (t)  N [0; IK dt]. What is important is that the distribution of
dZi (t) be non-degenerate. If it is not, then the players may be able to obtain
exact { as opposed to noisy { information about the state of the world by
looking at an appropriate linear combination of the signals.
13.2 The Filtering Argument
Suppose that the posterior concerning the state of the world l is given by p 2
RL, with
PL
l=1 pl = 1. Suppose furthermore that player i chooses xi 2 f0; 1g,
45


























pl1pl2 (l1k   pk) (l2k   pk)
and p =
PL
l=1 pll. C.f. Theorem 9.1 of Liptser and Shiryayev [16]. More-
over, the expectation of player i's current payo is







l . Hence the original problem is equivalent to a new
problem in which the players control the variance of the stochastic process p











where xi(t) is the action chosen by player i at time t. (Note that xi(t) also
depends on the history of the process p.)
Remark 9 It is now easy to see that the original model is eectively a special
case of the present model. One need only set K = 1, L = 2, 1 = 
N
,
2 = 1 + 
N
, w11 = w
1
2 = s, w
2
1 = `, w
2
2 = h, 11 = `= and 21 = h=.
13.3 The Time-Change Argument
We can transform the controlled-variance problem to a randomized-stopping
problem by introducing a new time variable et according to the formula













In the new problem:
 there is no discounting;
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 there are no ow payos;




 at each instant of time, the game comes to an end with probability
r det
N  PNi=1 xi 1 + PNi=1 xi 2 ;
 if the game does come to an end, player i receives a lump-sum payo
of
(1  xi)w1(p) + xiw2(p).
Remark 10 The randomized-stopping problem introduced in this section and
the randomized-stopping problem used in Section 5 are not identical, but they
are closely related. In fact, it is easy to check that the Bellman equation for




















which corresponds to a randomized-stopping problem of the type introduced in
the present section. Similarly, the team version of the randomized-stopping
problem considered in the present section is equivalent to a randomized-
stopping problem in which: (i) all payos are measured relative to the payo
w1; (ii) there is no discounting; (iii) the state variable p evolves according to
the equation dp  N
h
0;(p) deti until such time as the process is stopped; (iv)
the ow payo   r(w
1 w2)
N(2 1)
is obtained up to the point at which the process is
stopped; (v) the process is stopped with probability r
(N n)1+n2
per unit time;




The advantage of the formulation used in Section 5 is that it leads quickly
to a characterization of the optimal policy. The advantage of the formula-
tion used in the present section is that it treats the two arms symmetrically,
and therefore leads to a randomized-stopping problem, the relevance of which
is easier to understand. (We did not introduce both problems in Section 5
because we did not want to overburden the exposition.)
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13.4 The Team Problem
We make the following assumptions:
(i) 2 > 1;
(ii) there exist l1 and l2 such that w
1
l1




(iii) l1 = l2 i l1 = l2.
In other words, arm 2 is more informative than arm 1, neither arm dominates
the other in payo terms, and no two states of the world are indistinguishable.
These assumptions are not substantive: if both arms are equally informa-
tive, then the team will choose the arm with the highest short-run payo; if
one arm dominates the other in payo terms, then that arm will always be
chosen; and if two states of the world are indistinguishable, then they can be
combined into a single composite state, thereby reducing the dimensionality
of the problem by one.
Let u be the value function for the team problem, let u1(p) =max fw1(p); w2(p)g
be the myopic payo, and let u0(p) =
PL
l=1 plmax fw1l ; w2l g be the full-
information payo. Then: u is convex in p; u is Lipschitz continuous jointly
in p, r, 1, 2 and N ; u1  u  u0 (with strict inequality for all interior p);
u is non-increasing in r (strictly decreasing for all interior p), u ! u0 as
r! 0, and u ! u1 as r!1; u is non-decreasing in N (strictly increasing
for all interior p), and u ! u0 as N !1; u is non-decreasing in 1 and 2
(strictly increasing for all interior p), and u ! u0 as 2 !1.
As for the amount of experimentation, it is a dominant strategy to play
arm 2 when w2 > w1. It therefore makes sense to say that experimentation
occurs if arm 2 is played when w1 > w2. Now it follows from the randomized-









2   1 .
Hence the experimentation region: is convex; is strictly decreasing in r, con-
verges to the zero-discounting experimentation region as r! 0, and vanishes
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as r ! 1; is strictly increasing in N , and converges to the entire region
fw1 > w2g as N ! 1; is strictly increasing in 2, and converges to the
entire region fw1 > w2g as 2 !1.
Remark 11 Each of the three dierent formulations of the team problem
has advantages. For example, that u is convex follows at once from the
original optimal-experimentation formulation of the team problem, and that
an optimal strategy exists follows most easily from the randomized-stopping
formulation. The randomized-stopping formulation is, however, probably the
most useful. For example, this formulation allows one to obtain explicit for-
mulae for the rate of change of u with r, N , 
1 and 2.
Remark 12 Somewhat stronger results are available in the case L = 2. In
this case: u is twice continuously dierentiable in p; u is strictly convex in
the sense that u00 > 0; and the experimentation region is strictly decreasing
in 1.
Remark 13 It is dicult to determine the variation of the experimenta-
tion region with 1 in the general case. Increases in 1 tend to increase the
experimentation region via an encouragement eect, and to decrease the ex-
perimentation region via a free-rider eect. However, by contrast with the
case L = 2, it is dicult to determine which of these eects dominates. In-
deed, as far as we know the experimentation region may grow in some places
and shrink in others.
Remark 14 The proof that u is Lipschitz continuous jointly in p, r, 
1, 2
and N follows the lines of Krylov [15], Sections 3.1 and 4.1.
13.5 The Strategic Problem
In order to ensure the existence of a symmetric equilibrium, it is necessary
to allow for mixing. That is, we must replace a player's choice of an action
xi 2 f0; 1g by the choice of a probability Xi 2 [0; 1]. Doing so leaves all
the formulae given so far in the present section unchanged, except that the
symbol `x' must be replaced by the symbol `X':
The strategic problem exhibits the same pair of complementarities as be-
fore: increasing the total experimentation of the other players increases a
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player's payo, and increasing her payo increases the amount of experimen-
tation that she is willing to undertake. By exploiting these, one can show that
it possesses a maximal symmetric equilibrium. Suppose that u# is the value
function of this equilibrium. Then: u1  u#  u (with strict inequality for
all interior p); u# is non-increasing in r (strictly decreasing for all interior
p), u# ! u0 as r ! 0, and u# ! u1 as r !1; u# is non-decreasing in N
(strictly increasing for all interior p), and u# converges to a limit less than
u0 as N ! 1 (strictly less than u0 for all interior p); u# is non-decreasing
in both 1 and 2 (strictly increasing for all interior p), and u# ! u0 as
2 !1. Similarly, one can show that the experimentation region: is strictly
decreasing in r, converges to the zero-discounting experimentation region as
r ! 0, and vanishes as r!1; is strictly increasing in N , and converges to
a limiting region strictly smaller than the region fw1 > w2g as N !1; and
is strictly increasing in 2, and converges to the entire region fw1 > w2g as
2 !1.
Remark 15 Stronger results are available in the case L = 2. In this case u#
is twice continuously dierentiable in p, and u# is strictly convex in the sense
that u00# > 0. In the general case, all we can show is that u# is measurable,
and there does not appear to be any reason why u# should be convex.
13.6 The Non-Degenerate Case
Associated with each signal k there is a contribution k(p) dt to the covari-
ance matrix of the posterior, where
kl1l2(p) = pl1pl2 (l1k   pk) (l2k   pk) :
In other words, signal k causes the posterior to move in the direction k(p),
where
kl (p) = pl (lk   pk) :
Hence, if rank
n
1(p); 2(p); :::; K(p)
o
= L 1, then p can move in all possi-
ble directions within the unit simplex in RL. LetM be the L byK+1 matrix
with entries Mlk = lk for 1  l  L and 1  k  K, and M(K+1)l = 1 for
1  l  L. Then it is easy to check that rank
n
1(p); 2(p); :::; K(p)
o
= L 1
for all interior p i rank (M) = L. We say that the game is non-degenerate
if this latter condition holds.
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When the game is non-degenerate, the value function for the team prob-
lem is twice continuously dierentiable, and is the unique bounded solution






























Similarly, the value function u# of the maximal symmetric equilibrium is




(N   T (p; uy (p))) 1 + T (p; uy (p)) 2

  
1   T (p; uy (p))
N
!
w1 (p)  uy (p)

+
T (p; uy (p))
N













T (p; u) =
8>>><>>>:
0 if A (p; u) < 0 and w1 (p) > w2 (p)
NA (p; u)
N   1 if A (p; u) 2 [0; N   1] and w
1 (p) > w2 (p)
N if A (p; u) > N   1 or w1 (p)  w2 (p)
9>>>=>>>;
and
A (p; u) =
u  w1 (p)
w1 (p)  w2 (p)  
N1
2   1 :
Remark 16 The assumption that 1 6= 2 automatically implies that the
game is non-degenerate when L = 2. This explains the smoothness results
described for this case in Sections 13.4 and 13.5.
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14 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed team and equilibrium experimentation in a
many-player common-value two-armed bandit problem in terms of the free-
rider eect and the encouragement eect. Our analysis allowed for a very
general specication of the number of states of the world, and of the pattern
of information generated by the two arms. It did not, however, allow for
many arms, nor did it allow the pattern of information generated by one arm
to dier from the pattern of information generated by the other. Allowing
for many arms, all yielding the same pattern of information, raises one new
issue: what is the best incentive-compatible pattern of experimentation?
Continuing to restrict attention to two arms, but allowing the pattern of
information generated by one arm to dier from the pattern of information
generated by the other, raises another: what is the best way of exploiting
the dierent patterns of information generated by the two arms? We hope
to address these issues in future work.
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